More generally, a consumer behaves like a rebel (conformist) if the product, from her point of view, has negative (positive) externality. In an era emphasizing personal identities, more and more consumers would like to be rebels in many circumstances. For example, they would prefer Asian-style pants, when seeing many friends and colleagues (their social network neighbors) wearing European-style. However, the rebel social network is still under-researched in comparison with vast literature on conformist social networks. For a market where all the consumers are rebels, as considered in this paper, it has been previously studied by several papers under the term of anti-coordination [4, 5] .
Model formulation
The market is represented by a social network G = (V , E), an undirected graph with node set V consisting of n consumers and link set E of m connections between consumers. A seller markets two (types of) products Y and N in G. We abuse notations by using Y and N to denote both types and products.
The marketing is done sequentially: The seller is able to ask the consumers one by one whether they are more interested in Y or in N . Each consumer buys (chooses) exactly one of Y and N , whichever provides her a larger total value, only at the time she is asked. This is a simplification of the so called precision marketing [17] . For every consumer, a product of type T ∈ {Y, N } provides her with total value p T + s T (x T ), where p T is a constant, and s T (x T ) is the social value determined by the decreasing function s T (·) and the number x T of her neighbors who have bought product T . We assume that p Y > p N , the difference p Y − p N is outweighed by the externality, i.e., for any permutation T , F of Y, N and any nonnegative integers x, y with x < y we have s T (y) . Under the assumption, it is easy to see that the marketing model can be summarized as the following scheduling problems on rebel social networks.
Rebels. Every consumer is a rebel who follows a minority criterion: At her turn to choose from {Y, N }, the consumer buys the product different from the one currently possessed by the majority of her neighbors; if there are equal numbers of neighbors having bought Y and N respectively, the consumer will always buy Y. We assume all consumers adopt the same tie breaking rule, which makes the two products asymmetric. This assumption will be lifted in our later discussion.
Scheduling. A marketing schedule, or simply a schedule, for network G is an ordering π of consumers in V which specifies the order π(v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n} of consumer v ∈ V being asked to buy (choose) Y or N , or "being scheduled" for short. We refer to the problem of finding a schedule for a rebel social network as the rebel scheduling problem.
Objective. Given schedule π , the choice, i.e., (purchase) decision, of each consumer v under π is uniquely determined, and we denote it by π [v] , which belongs to {Y, N }. In short, Each consumer v ∈ V makes choice π [v] ∈ {Y, N } at time π(v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}.
The decisions of all consumers form the marketing outcome (π [v] : v ∈ V ) of π . The basic goal of the rebel scheduling problem is profit maximization: finding a schedule whose outcome contains Y (resp. N ) decisions as many as possible when Y (resp. N ) is more profitable for the seller.
Regret-proofness. As seen above, the value of a product changes as the marketing proceeds. Every schedule corresponds to a dynamic game among consumers. We assume that consumers behave naively without predictions. A natural question is: Can these simple behaviors (or equivalently, a schedule) eventually lead to a Nash equilibrium -a state where no consumer regrets her previous decision? This question is of both theoretical and practical interests. Schedules that lead to Nash equilibria are called regret-proof ; they guarantee high consumer satisfaction, which is beneficial to the seller's future marketing. The rebel scheduling problem also addresses the constrained optimization: finding regret-proof schedule to maximize profit. It is worth noting that the constraint on regret-proofness is unique for negative externalities, because under positive externality, consumers never regret their decisions.
Adaption to one-product marketing. When one interprets Y as buying and N as not buying, the above model is fit for marketing of one product with negative externality, as long as consumers can distinguish between those who have made a not-buying decision and those who have not made any decision yet. However, the above requirement is quite unrealistic. Therefore, it might be more natural to consider the following two adaptations (O) and (P). In the marketing of a new product (so initially no consumer has the product), facing the promotion, a consumer chooses buying if and only if (O) at least a half of her neighbors do not have the product, or (P) more than a half of her neighbors do not have the product.
The only difference between (O) and (P) lies on their tie breaking rules: the former favors "buying" while the latter favors "not-buying". In terms of the rebel purchase decisions, (O) models the most optimistic outlook by the seller, while (P) describes his most pessimistic view. The scheduling problem for promoting one product under (O) (resp. (P)) is referred to as the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) scheduling problem. Naturally, both problems aim to maximize the number of buying decisions. Although neither optimistic nor pessimistic scheduling problem (with one product) is a special case of the rebel scheduling (with two products) in terms of model formulation, both problems are amenable to our algorithmic strategies for rebel scheduling.
Results and contributions
We show that the rebel scheduling problem for profit maximization is NP-hard and admits nice approximations. Using edge-cuts as a basic tool, we find regret-proof schedule in polynomial time. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to address the scheduling problems for marketing products with negative externalities, i.e., marketing in rebel social networks.
In Section 2, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a marketing schedule that maximizes the number of Y (resp. N ) decisions. Complementary to the NP-hardness, we design O (n 2 )-time algorithms, respectively, for finding schedules that guarantee at least n/2 decisions of Y, and at least n/3 decisions of N . The tightness of our results can be seen from complete networks and triangles, respectively. In contrast, decentralized consumer choices in the worst case might result in an arbitrarily bad outcome. This can be seen from the star network, where in the worst case only one consumer chooses the product consistent with the seller's objective.
In Section 3, we design efficient algorithms for finding regret-proof schedules. Let α denote the size of maximum independent set of G. We show that regret-proof schedules that guarantee at least n/2 decisions of Y and at least max{ √ n + 1 − 1, (n − α)/2} decisions of N , respectively, can be found in time O (mn 2 ). Moreover, our algorithms for maximizing the number of Y (resp. N ) decisions can be extended to deal with the optimistic scheduling (resp. pessimistic scheduling) for promoting only one product, where ties are broken in favor of the buying decision (resp. not-buying decision). In the optimistic case, we can find a regret-proof schedule that ensures at least a half of consumers to buy the product. In the pessimistic case, the promotion can be scheduled such that at least a third of consumers buy the product; under the constraint of regret-free decisions, a number max{
sales can be guaranteed.
In Section 4, we present extension of our algorithm to the social network containing both rebels and conformists, to the case where the products are completely symmetric (consumers break ties by choosing Y or N with equal probability), and to the case where different consumers might adopt different tie breaking rules, which are their private information (unknown to the seller). Then we conclude the paper with remarks on future research.
Maximization
We study the rebel scheduling problem to maximize seller's profits in saying at least (resp. at most) r nodes or links, we mean at least r (resp. at most r ) nodes or links.
When Y is more profitable
It is desirable to find an optimal schedule that maximizes the number of consumers purchasing Y. Although this turns out to be a very hard task (Theorem 2.1), we can guarantee that at least half of the consumers choose Y (Theorem 2.2).
Theorem 2.1. The rebel scheduling problem for maximizing the number of Y decisions is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove by reduction from the maximum independent set problem. Given any instance of the maximum independent set problem on connected graph H = (N, F ), by adding some pendant nodes to H we construct in polynomial time a network G (an instance of the rebel scheduling problem): For each node u ∈ N with degree d(u) in H , we add a set P u of d(u) nodes, and connect each of them to u. The resulting network G = (V , E) is specified by V := N ∪ ( u∈N P u ) and E := F ∪ ( u∈N {up: p ∈ P u }), where each node in V \ N = u∈N P u is pendant, and each node u ∈ N is non-pendant and has exactly 2d(u) neighbors: half of them are non-pendant nodes in N and the other half are the d(u) pendant nodes in P u . Consider π being an optimal schedule for G. If θ(π ) = 0, then π schedules all pendant nodes before their neighbors, and hence all of these pendant nodes choose Y. It follows from Claim 1 that {v ∈ N: π[v] = Y} is an independent set of H . Since π is optimal, the independent set is maximum in H . Thus, in view of (2.1), to prove the theorem, it suffices to show the following.
Claim 2.
Given an optimal schedule π for G with θ(π ) > 0, another optimal schedule π for G with θ(π ) < θ(π ) can be found in polynomial time.
Since θ(π ) > 0, we can take w ∈ N to be the last non-pendant node scheduled by π earlier than some of its pendant neighbors. Under π , let P w (∅ = P w ⊆ P w ) be the set of all pendant neighbors of w that are scheduled after w, let U be the set of non-pendant nodes scheduled after w, and let P U be the set of the pendant nodes whose (non-pendant) neighbors belong to U (possibly U = ∅ = P U ). The choice of w implies that π schedules every node in P U before its neighbor. Without loss of generality we may assume that under π ,
• (Pendant) nodes in P U are scheduled before all other nodes (with Y).
• (Pendant) nodes in P w are scheduled immediately after w one by one.
• (Non-pendant) nodes in U are scheduled at last.
If π schedules w with N , then at later time it schedules all pendant nodes in P w with Y. Another optimal schedule π (for G) with the same outcome as π can be constructed as follows: π schedules nodes in P w first, and then schedules other nodes of V in a relative order the same as π . We next design an algorithm for finding a schedule that ensures at least n/2 decisions of Y. The algorithm iteratively constructs a node set A for which there exist two schedules π and π scheduling each node in A with different decisions. We call π and π dual schedules of each other (for the subgraph of G induced by A). At any time, nodes inside (resp. outside) A are called scheduled (resp. unscheduled). In the end,
• at least half of the scheduled nodes are scheduled with Y decisions by one of the dual schedules; and • all unscheduled nodes (if any) form an independent set, and subsequently will all choose Y in an arbitrary schedule to them.
For convenience, we reserve symbol "schedule" for the scheduling (constructing dual schedules π and π ) as conducted at Steps 3 and 5 in Algorithm 1. Similarly, we also say "schedule a node" and "schedule a link" with the implicit understanding that the node and the link satisfy the conditions in Step 2 and Step 5 of Algorithm 1. The following claim specifies the property of dual schedules.
Algorithm 1.

Input: Network G = (V , E).
Output: Partial schedule π for G.
Initial setting:
A ← ∅, t ← 1, π ← a null schedule 2. While there exists w ∈ V \ A which has different numbers of neighbors in A choosing Y and N respectively under π do 3.
Go back to Step 2.
6. Let π be π or π whichever schedules more nodes with Y (break tie arbitrarily) Proof. The algorithm enlarges A gradually at Steps 3 and 5, producing a sequence of node sets
Suppose that k 1 and the statement is true for A k−1 . In case of A k being produced at Step 2, suppose w has n 1 (resp. (ii) The nodes in V \ A (if any) form an independent set of G (by Step 5) . 
Step 1 is to find a node w / ∈ A with δ w = 0 by visiting
Step 5 is to find a node u ∈ V \ A with δ u 1 and then find a neighbor u ∈ V \ A of v. The search in both Steps 2 and 5 takes O (n) time. Each time Algorithm 1 adds a node v to A, the algorithm updates the entries of v's neighbors in the array, which takes O (n) time. Since we can add at most n nodes to A,
Algorithm 1 can be used to solve the optimistic scheduling problem when only one product is promoted, where, facing promotion, a consumer buys the product if and only if at least half of her neighbors do not have the product. Formally, we have the following result.
Corollary 2.3. In the optimistic scheduling problem, a schedule that ensures at least n/2 buying decisions can be found in
Proof. Let π be a schedule stated in Theorem 2.2. Under π , a set A of at least n/2 consumers choose Y. In the optimistic scheduling problem, we restrict our promotion to A . We promote the product only to consumers of A in the same relative order as π visits them. It is easy to see that all these consumers will buy the product. 2
The tightness of n/2 in both Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.3 can be seen from the case where the network G is a complete graph. Moreover, the theorem and corollary imply that Algorithm 1 and its adaptation provide 2-approximate solutions to the rebel scheduling problem for maximizing Y decisions and the optimistic scheduling problem, respectively.
When N is more profitable
In this subsection, the marketing scheduling is to maximize the number of N decisions. By reduction from the bounded occurrence MAX-2SAT problem (see Appendix A), we obtain the following NP-hardness.
Theorem 2.4. The rebel scheduling problem for maximizing the number of N decisions is NP-hard. 2
Next, we design an O (n 2 ) time algorithm for finding a schedule which ensures at least n/3 decisions of N . This is
accomplished by a refinement of Algorithm 1 with some preprocessing.
Outline. When Algorithm 1 constructs dual schedules, there is a lot of arbitrariness in choosing the node w at Step 2 and the link uv at Step 5. In this subsection, we will define a "nested" specification on these choices. By preprocessing, we find a sequence of "nested" subgraphs
and some other properties. Particularly, G 1 contains a maximal independent set X of G. In the refinement (i.e., Algorithm 2 below), we confine our choices (of nodes and links for constructing dual schedules) to smaller G i whenever possible. The properties of the nested subgraphs enable us to inductively prove that all the nodes in every G i are scheduled by the dual schedules constructed.
If, at the end of Algorithm 2, at least 2n/3 nodes are scheduled, then one of the dual schedules ensures at least n/3 decisions of N . Otherwise, the unscheduled nodes form an independent set of size at least n/3, which is disjoint from and dominated by X . These nodes can be scheduled all with N by another schedule (which makes all nodes in X choose Y at the very beginning).
The following terminologies are useful for our discussion. Given a graph H with node set U , let R, S ⊆ U be two node subsets. We say that R dominates S if every node in S has at least a neighbor in R. We use H \ R to denote the graph obtained from H by deleting all nodes in R (as well as their incident links). Thus H \ R is the subgraph of H induced by U \ R, which we also denote as
Preprocessing. Given a connected social network G = (V , E), let X be any maximal independent set of G. It is clear that
• X and Y := V \ X are disjoint node sets dominating each other.
We will partition X into
•
The minimality of Y \ Y 0 implies that in graph G 1 every node in Y \ Y 0 is adjacent to at least one pendant node in X \ X 0 .
, and we repeat the above process with
j=1 X j , and X i is the set of all pendant nodes of G i contained in
The procedure terminates at i = for which we have X \ j=0 X j = ∅, and Refinement. Our next algorithm shows that Algorithm 1 can be implemented in a "nested" way such that all nodes of subgraph G 1 are scheduled by a pair of dual schedules. In the following pseudocode, A denotes the current set of scheduled nodes by the dual schedules constructed in the algorithm.
The validity of Step 9 is guaranteed by Claim 3. Moreover, Claim 4(ii) says that when the algorithm finishes, V \ A (if nonempty) is an independent set of G. None of its nodes belongs to X , as the following claim shows.
Claim 6. At the end of Algorithm
Proof. We only need to show that each node
In case of w ∈ X k , it is pendant and has only one neighbor u in subgraph G k . If u ∈ A when w is checked at Step 3, then w is selected to A at Step 4; Otherwise, w and u will be selected to A at the same time in Step 7.
In case of w ∈ Y k , by Claim 5, w is adjacent to a pendant node v ∈ X k of G k . If, when checked at Step 3, w has different numbers of neighbors in A choosing Y and N , then it is selected to A at Step 4; otherwise, node v must have not been selected to A, and subsequently w and v are put into A together at Step 7. 2 Algorithm 2.
Output: Partial schedule π for G. 
Corollary 2.6. In the pessimistic scheduling problem, a schedule that ensures at least n/3 buying decisions can be found in
The tightness of n/3 in both Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.6 can be seen from the triangle network, a cycle of length 3.
Regret-proof schedules
This section is devoted to algorithm design for finding regret-proof schedules, where every consumer, given the choices of other consumers in the outcome of the schedule, would prefer the product she bought to the other. Subject to regretproofness, we wish to maximize seller's profits.
The outcomes of regret-proof schedules give rise to so-called stable cuts, which characterize regret-proof schedules.
Using link cuts as a tool, we find in O (mn 2 ) time regret-proof schedules that ensure at least n/2 decisions of Y and at least √ n + 1 − 1 decisions of N , respectively.
Stable cuts
Given G = (V , E), let R and S be two disjoint subsets of V . We use [R, S] to denote the set of links (in E) with one end in R and the other in S. A basic operation in our algorithms is "enlarging" unstable cuts by moving "violating" nodes from one side to the other.
Let [S 1 , S 2 ] be an unstable cut of G for which some v ∈ S i (i = 1 or 2) is violating. We define type-i move of v (from S i to S 3−i ) to be the setting: S i ← S i \ {v}, S 3−i ← S 3−i ∪ {v}, which changes the cut. The violation of (3.1) implies (M1) type-1 move increases the cut size, and downsizes the leading set; (M2) type-2 move does not decrease the cut size, and enlarges the leading set. As a byproduct of (M1) and (M2), one can easily deduce that the rebel game on a network, where each rebel switches between two choices in favor of the minority choice of her neighbors, is a potential game and thus possesses a Nash equilibrium. The potential function is defined as the size of the cut between the rebels holding different choices.
The following data structure is employed for efficiently identifying violations as well as verifying the stability of the cut.
of length n, where i(v) ∈ {1, 2} is the set index satisfying S i(v) v, and (v) = d S 3−i(v) (v) − d S i(v) (v) together with i(v) is the indicator of whether v is violating. A node v is violating if and only if (v) < 0 when
we can find a violating node v (if any) and move it. After the move, we update the array (to be the one for the current cut) in O (n) time by modifying the entries corresponding to v and its neighbors. Without consideration of the O (m) time creation of the array, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. In O (n) time, either the current cut is verified to be stable, or a move is found and conducted. 2
The following procedure, as a subroutine of our algorithm, finds a stable cut whose leading set contains at least half nodes of G. Observe from Step 2 that each (implementation) of the while-loop at Step 3 starts with a cut whose leading set has at least n/2 nodes. If this while-loop ends with a smaller leading set, by Lemma 3.1(ii) it must be the case that the while-loop conducts type-1 moves more times than conducting type-2 moves. Therefore after O (m 1 ) moves, the procedure either terminates, or implements a while-loop that ends with a leading set S 1 not smaller than the one at the beginning of the while-loop. In the latter case, the until-condition at Step 4 is satisfied, and the procedure terminates. The number of moves conducted by the last while-loop is O (m 1 + n) as implied by Lemma 3.1(i). 2
Procedure 1.
Input: Network G and its cut
[S 1 , S 2 ]. Output: Stable cut [T 1 , T 2 ] := Prc1(S 1 , S 2 ) in G. 1. Repeat 2. If |S 1 | < n/2 then [S 1 , S 2 ] ← [S 2 , S 1 ] // swap S 1 and S 2 3. While ∃ violating node v w.r.t. [S 1 , S 2 ] do move v // [S 1 , S 2 ] is changing 4. Until |S 1 | n/2 5. Return [T 1 , T 2 ] ← [S 1 , S 2 ] Lemma 3.3. Procedure 1 produces in O (tn + n 2 ) time a stable cut [T 1 , T 2 ] of G such that |T 1 | n/2, where t = |[T 1 , T 2 ]| − |[S 1 , S 2 ]| 0.
Y-preferred schedules
When Y is more profitable, we aim at a maximum number of Y decisions subject to regret-proofness. The basic idea behind our algorithm for finding regret-proof schedules goes as follows: Given a stable cut [S 1 , S 2 ], we try to schedule nodes in S 1 with Y and nodes in S 2 with N whenever possible. If not all nodes can be scheduled this way, we obtain another stable cut of larger size, from which we repeat the process. In the following pseudo-code description, scheduling an unscheduled node changes the node to be scheduled.
Note that cuts [S 1 , S 2 ] returned by Procedure 1 at Step 3 are stable. At the end of Step 6, if
not stable). Thus the condition in
Step 7 is equivalent to saying "until all nodes of G are scheduled".
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Algorithm 3.
Input: Network G and its cut
Output: A schedule for G.
Initial setting: D
. Set all nodes of G to be unscheduled Proof. Consider Step 6 setting S 1 = ∅. Since nodes in S 1 ∪ S 2 cannot be scheduled, we have 
The overall running time follows from the fact that O (n 2 ) time is enough for finishing a whole while-loop at
Step 5.
Note from Lemma 3.3 
N -preferred schedules
The goal of this subsection is to design an algorithm for finding a regret-proof schedule with as many N decisions as possible. In the following Algorithm 4, we work on a dynamically changing cut [S 1 , S 2 ] of G whose size keeps nondecreasing. Our algorithm consists of 2-layer nested repeat-loops.
• • Termination: We stop when we obtain (consecutively) two schedules whose associated cuts have equal size.
• Output: Between the obtained schedules, we output the better one with a maximum number of N decisions.
In the following pseudo-code, we use r and s to denote the sizes of cuts associated with the two schedules we find consecutively. We use K to denote the largest number of N decisions we currently achieve by some schedule.
Throughout the algorithm, the size of [S 1 , S 2 ] keeps nondecreasing, and may increase at Step 5 (see Lemma 3 .1) and
Step 9. Note that Steps 7 and 8 are exactly Steps 5 and 6 of Algorithm 3. So, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the
Step 9 increases the cut size. While ∃ unscheduled v ∈ S i (i ∈{1, 2}) whose decision is D i do schedule v 8.
T i ← {scheduled nodes with decision
//reset [S 1 , S 2 ] to be a larger cut
10.
Until S 1 = ∅ // until all nodes are scheduled 11. Performance. Let r * 1 denote the final common value of r and s in Algorithm 4. It is easy to see that the algorithm implements Step 5 at least twice (as otherwise, r * = 0). Let W −1 (resp. W ) denote the second-last (resp. last) implementation of (the while-loop at) Step 5.
implying that between W −1 and W , no implementation of Step 9 increases the cut size. After W −1 , the algorithm does
, it schedules all nodes of K 1 with Y, and all nodes of K 2 with N ) until it swaps S 1 and S 2 at Step 3. Subsequently, W starts with
Since W does not increase the cut size, any violating node v satisfies d S 1 (v) = d S 2 (v) at the time it is moved. Therefore, recalling (3.1), the moves conducted by W (if any) are type-2 ones, which move nodes from S 2 to S 1 . Let T (⊆ K 1 ) denote the set of all these nodes moved. It is clear that V is the disjoint union of K 2 , L 2 and T such that 
Claim 7. If T = ∅, then T is an independent set of graph G, and d L
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that two nodes x, y ∈ T are adjacent, and the while-loop W moves x earlier than moving y (from S 2 to S 1 ). By (3.2) , at the beginning of
any time of this while-loop. At the time W considers y, node x has been moved to S 1 and d S 2 (y) = d S 1 (y). The adjacency of x and y implies that d S 2 (y) > d S 1 (y) and y ∈ S 2 hold before x is removed from S 2 , which is a contradiction. So T is an independent set. It follows that throughout the while-loop,
any v ∈ T follows from the fact that G is connected, and T is independent. 2
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm 4 finds a regret-proof schedule of G that ensures at least max{
√ n + 1 − 1, 1 2 (n − α)} decisions of N ,
where α is the independence number of G.
Proof. Note that the schedule output by the algorithm has its associated cut stable. Thus the algorithm does output a regret-proof schedule. Suppose the output schedule ensures a number k of N decisions. Since the algorithm has scheduled all nodes of K 2 (resp. L 2 ) with N , Step 11 guarantees that
as V is the disjoint union of K 2 , L 2 , T , and T is either empty or an independent set of G. It remains to prove k λ := √ n + 1 − 1. Suppose on the contrary that k < λ, saying |K 2 | < λ and 2) and (3.3) , the stability of
Remark 3.6. Similar to Corollary 2.6, the output of Algorithm 4 specifies a regret-proof schedule for the pessimistic marketing of one product such that at least max{
(n − α)} consumers buy the product. 2
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied, from an algorithmic point of view, the marketing schedule problem for promoting products with negative externalities, aiming at profit maximization (from the seller's perspective) and regret-free decisions (from the consumers' perspective). We have shown that the problem of finding a schedule achieving maximum profit is NP-hard, and it admits constant-factor approximations.
In our model formulation (see Section 1.2), we assume that the network consists of only rebels, and the two products are asymmetric, i.e., ties are broken in favor of Y when an equal number of neighbors buy Y and N respectively. In Section 4.1, we present extensions of our results when these assumptions are removed. In Section 4.2, we discuss directions for future algorithmic study on network marketing products with negative externalities.
Extension
Our algorithm for maximizing the number of Y decisions can be extended to deal with the generalization on networks where some consumers might be conformists (see Section 4.1.1), and the situation where products Y and N are completely symmetric (see Section 4.1.2). Our algorithm for maximizing the number of N decisions can be used to guarantee at least n/3 nodes to choose the product preferred by the seller regardless of tie breaking rules (see Section 4.1.2).
Conformists vs. rebels
Recall that rebels and conformists follow the minority criterion and the majority one, respectively, in their choices of products. Given network G = (V , E) formed by rebel consumers and conformist consumers (either or both), we can still find a schedule that makes at least a half of consumers choose Y. 
Then we extend π and π to be schedules for G by scheduling nodes in C in the same arbitrary order. 
Symmetry vs. asymmetry
Algorithm 1 can be used to solve the rebel scheduling problem when the two products are completely symmetric, i.e., facing product promotion and an equal number of neighbors buying Y and N respectively, a consumer chooses N and Y with equal probability 1/2. Using Algorithm 1, we can first schedule a set of consumers such that half of them choose Y (resp. N ) deterministically. Then we schedule the remaining nodes in an arbitrary order. Each of them choose Y (resp. N ) with probability 1/2. We end up with at least n/2 preferred decisions in expectation. Algorithm 2 together with its extension ensures at least n/3 preferred decisions no matter what tie breaking rules consumers use. This is particularly useful when multiple tie breaking rules are used in the same market and it is costly for the seller to get information about that. Indeed, when N is preferred, the schedule stated in Theorem 2.5 fulfills the task. When Y is preferred, using Algorithm 2, we can schedule some nodes such that at least half of them choose Y and the unscheduled nodes form an independent set. Either we have assured n/3 decisions of Y or the independent set has a size larger than n/3. In the latter case, we can make all the nodes in the independent set choose Y by scheduling them from the very beginning. 
Future research
The numbers n/2 and n/3 in Theorems 2.2 and 2.5, together with the trivial upper bound n on the optimal objective values, imply that the approximation ratios of our algorithms are at least 1/2 and 1/3, respectively. We did not have any nontrivial estimation on the approximation ratios of our algorithms. Actually, for our special networks (the complete networks) that show the tightness of n/2 and n/3, all schedules are optimal because all nodes are symmetric. It seems unlikely that the 1/2 and 1/3 approximation ratios are tight for our algorithms. It would be nice, on the one hand, to obtain a tight analysis on the approximation rations of our algorithms, and on the other hand, to design new algorithms with improved performance guarantees.
When scheduling for maximizing the number of N decisions, a number of independent triangles show that the number n/3 given in Theorem 2.5 is the best possible for networks without isolated vertices. It turns out that the disconnectivity is a major obstacle for increasing the worst-case ratio n/3. We have developed an algorithm that, given any connected network of n 4 nodes, finds in polynomial time a schedule ensuring at least (1 + )n/3 decisions of N , where = 1/400. Our theoretical analysis is far from tight, where our method performs much better in all instances we simulated. It would be nice to improve the marginal 1/400 to some considerably larger number.
We have found in polynomial time the schedules that lead to regret-free decisions. These regret-proof schedules have satisfactory performance in terms of profit maximization, while it is left open whether both regret-proofness and constant profit approximation can be guaranteed in case of product N being more profitable. The following instance of rebel scheduling problem shows that for any ε > 0 no regret-proof schedule can always guarantee an outcome with more than n/4 + ε decisions of N . (n − α)} in Theorem 3.2 requires more insights about the graphical structures. Our model and results apply to marketing one or two (types of) products with negative externalities in undirected social networks. An interesting question is what happens when marketing three or more (types of) products and/or the network is directed.
The marketing schedule problem studied in this paper assumes the passive roles of consumers who wait for product promotions scheduled by the seller. In a market where consumers might actively seek purchases, enforcing a schedule becomes very difficult. More strategies, such as pricing [2, 9] , are needed to induce a schedule of consumer purchase decisions. This makes the schedule problem much more challenging, especially for products with negative externalities.
• Proof. Let T be the set of TRUE literals in an optimal truth assignment of I . Then T is an independent set of literal nodes in G such that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N, exactly one of x i and ¬x i is contained in T . The schedule π proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, π schedules the (literal) nodes in T and then the M clause nodes. Since T is independent, all its nodes choose Y. Therefore, the opt(I) clause nodes (which correspond to the satisfied clauses) all choose N .
In the second stage, π schedules gadgets one after another in an arbitrary order. For each gadget G i , let x be x i or ¬x i whichever belongs to T and thus has chosen Y. Within subnetwork G i , schedule π proceeds in five steps. (1) π schedules Assignment. Let π * be a schedule for G that leads to a maximum number opt(G) of N decisions. To establish the reverse inequality of the one in Lemma A.1, we will construct a truth assignment for I based on π * 's schedule of literal nodes. Preprocessing. Initially, we set graph H to be G = (V , E). We find in O (m) time a maximal independent set X of H , and set Y := V \ X . To find X i , Y i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , , we will modify H step by step via removing some nodes (together with their incident links). At any step, we call a node of H an X -node (resp. a Y -node) if this node belongs to X (resp. Y ). In H , a Y -node is critical if it is adjacent to a pendant X -node. Any single non-critical node can be removed from H without destroying the Y -node domination of X -nodes. (iii) removing all nodes of X i+1 from H , and updates H which gives H = G i+1 .
Running time.
Next we show that all the above + 1 stages finish in O (m) time. At the initiation step, in O (m) time we find the set of pendant X -nodes, and the set of non-critical Y -nodes of H , where H = G.
As our preprocessing proceeds, when we remove a Y -node v from H , we update H by modifying the adjacency list representation of H , and
